domingo, 20 de março de 2022

Which African countries foresee refugee waves to Europe in the wheat crisis?

 

  

 Éric Verhaeghe 

19 March 2022

The wheat crisis that is looming with the disruption of agricultural work in Ukraine, and the threats of an embargo on Russian wheat will not be without consequence on the migration crises in the Mediterranean. Indeed, due to globalisation, many providers of migrants have become highly dependent on Ukrainian or Russian wheat, and wheat imports in general. Here is a small inventory of the disturbances that could occur in the coming months on the delicate migratory balance.

 


As you can see in the above chart, many African countries will find themselves in difficulty because of the wheat crisis in Ukraine and Russia. The two belligerents are indeed the granaries for Africa.

In the event that the wheat harvest in Ukraine as in Russia should decrease sharply (above all in Ukraine, where agricultural preparations are likely to suffer), certain African countries such as Somalia risk losing a large part of their
cereal supply, which would have dramatic consequences for the local populations. 

African countries by population and impact

Here is the list of African countries that are dependent on Russian and Ukrainian wheat, organised in order of population:

Egypt: 106 million inhabitants, 60% dependent on Russian wheat and 20% on Ukrainian wheat.

Democratic Republic of Congo: 94.5 million inhabitants, 55% dependent on Russian wheat, 15% on Ukrainian wheat.

Tanzania: 63 million inhabitants, 65% dependent on Russian wheat, 3% on Ukrainian wheat.

South Africa: 60.3 million inhabitants, 31% dependent on Russian wheat, 4% on Ukrainian wheat.

Kenya: 56.3 million inhabitants, 33% dependent on Russian wheat, 7% on Ukrainian wheat.

Uganda: 48 million inhabitants, 44% dependent on Russian wheat, 8% on Ukrainian wheat.

Sudan: 45.4 million inhabitants, 70% dependent on Russian wheat and 5% on Ukrainian wheat.

Mozambique: 32.7 million inhabitants, 35% dependent on Russian wheat, 4% on Ukrainian wheat.

Madagascar: 29 million inhabitants, 62% dependent on Russian wheat.

Burkina Faso: 22 million inhabitants, 53% dependent on Russian wheat, 3% on Ukrainian wheat.

Malawi: 20.1 million inhabitants, 35% dependent on Russian wheat, 3% on Ukrainian wheat.

Senegal: 17.6 million inhabitants, 50% dependent on Russian wheat, 20% on Ukrainian wheat.

Somalia: 16.5 million inhabitants, 32% dependent on Russian wheat and 67% on Ukrainian wheat.

Rwanda: 13.5 million inhabitants, 65% dependent on Russian wheat.

Benin: 12.6 million inhabitants, 100% dependent on Russian wheat.

Burundi: 12.6 million inhabitants, 52% dependent on Russian wheat.

Tunisia: 12 million inhabitants, 8% dependent on Russian wheat, and 45% on Ukrainian wheat.

Togo: 8.7 million inhabitants, 42% dependent on Russian wheat.

Libya: 6.8 million inhabitants, 18% dependent on Russian wheat and 35% on Ukrainian wheat.

Congo-Brazzaville: 5.7 million inhabitants, 60% dependent on Russian wheat, 1% on Ukrainian wheat.

Mauritania: 4.8 million inhabitants, 16% dependent on Russian wheat, 27% on Ukrainian wheat.

Eritrea: 3.7 million inhabitants, 20% dependent on Russian wheat, 15% on Ukrainian wheat.

Namibia: 2.6 million inhabitants, 45% dependent on Russian wheat.

Gambia: 2.5 million inhabitants, 30% dependent on Russian wheat and 25% on Ukrainian wheat.

Cape Verde: 0.5 million inhabitants, 38% dependent on Russian wheat.

We should specify the meaning of these figures: that Burundi, for example, is 52% dependent upon Russian wheat does not mean that half of the food of Burundians is imported from Russia. It only means that half of Burundi's wheat import volume comes from Russia.

In other words, these figures in no way prejudge the total food dependence of the country. They only give an indication of the sensitivity of the local market to the Ukrainian crisis (which, it will be recalled, will produce a knock-on rise in global prices, since the countries that can no longer import from Ukraine will make up for their shortfalls on other markets.

A predictable migration crisis in the Mediterranean

The UN figures clearly explain why African countries overwhelmingly refused to vote for sanctions against Russia at the UN.

Above all, the UN chart foreshadows a major migration crisis in the Mediterranean, due to the dependence of three major players on Ukrainian wheat, which is likely to become scarce this year:

 * Egypt is only 50% self-sufficient in wheat. In other words, 10% of its food needs are now covered by Ukrainian wheat, and 30% by Russian wheat. The alimentary and social risks incurred by this country of more than 100 million inhabitants is clear...

*  Tunisia is almost 96% self-sufficient in cereals, but the remaining 4% is heavily dependent on Russia and Ukraine. The impact of the food crisis should therefore be more limited there.

*  Libya is not considered by the FAO to be highly dependent on food imports, but it could nevertheless experience a major shock during this crisis, with an increase in agricultural prices.

*  Senegal, which provides many candidates for migration, is on the other hand one of the African countries most dependent on imports of basic products.

Overall, it should be noted that Egypt and Senegal could suffer greatly from the disturbances on the grain markets caused by the Ukrainian conflict. This disruption is largely explained by globalisation and the African choice to abandon traditional agricultural products in favour of imported Asian rice and Eurasian wheat.

The consequence of this choice could be a new major food crisis, and a new migration crisis in the Mediterranean in the months to come.


Source: https://lecourrierdesstrateges.fr/2022/03/19/quels-pays-africains-risquent-denvoyer-le-plus-de-refugies-en-europe-a-cause-de-la-crise-du-ble/

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