Nuso.org | Monday, 23/02/2026 (leer en español)
The US military attack on Venezuela on January 3, along with the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, has sparked intense debate about how it could have happened, what the new government of Delcy Rodríguez represents, and what all this means for Venezuelan sovereignty.
In this interview, Malfred Gerig, a sociologist and graduate of the Central University of Venezuela, and author of the book *The Long Venezuelan Depression: Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Oil Century*, addresses the political, economic, moral, and military decline of the Maduro regime, which transformed Venezuela into such a weak link that Donald Trump's actions proved remarkably easy. He also reflects on the characteristics of the new protectorate and the possibilities of finding the energy to recover national autonomy and a democratic future. And, no less importantly, he critically examines the position of the international left regarding the Venezuelan crisis.
How do you interpret the US military actions that, after deploying warships in the Caribbean for several months, culminated in a military assault and the kidnapping of Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Congresswoman Cilia Flores? Was the motivation simply to gain control of Venezuelan oil?
Obviously, the military intervention is related to oil, because everything concerning Venezuela is always related to oil. But it's a bit more complex, because two things came together here: the Venezuelan crisis and Trump's foreign policy. The long Venezuelan depression and the political crisis were compounded by the transfer of the conflict to the international arena. The weakening, over so many years, of the sources of national power—economic, political, institutional, military, and cultural—ultimately led to the most humiliating episode in Venezuela's republican history.
This national weakening made intervention in Venezuela appealing to Trump. First, because he was acting against a government without a social base and without rational-legal legitimacy. The United States knew that the Venezuelan people would not come out to defend Maduro, and this weighed heavily in the equation that led to the military action. They intervened against an unpopular head of state lacking democratic legitimacy. Second, because the country's political institutions were completely illegitimate and severely weakened in terms of their capacity for wielding real power—as seen in the (non)reaction to the military operation. And third, because the Maduro government, being a weak government that had undermined state capabilities for so many years in order to cling to power for its own sake, was an easy target for the United States to begin reshaping its entire foreign policy toward Latin America.
To this we can add that the Venezuelan political class doubled down on externalizing the conflict, believing that Trump would arbitrate in good faith in favor of one of the parties, without subsequently demanding anything in return. In the case of the opposition, this is very clear: they sought Trump's support to overthrow the regime and seize power. But the Maduro regime simultaneously sought an agreement with Trump that would legitimize electoral fraud and repression; a normalization that required Washington's blessing. I have called this, using Turkey as an example, Maduro's failed "Erdoganization," a failed transition to "competitive authoritarianism."
Here we see the moral, ethical, and above all, strategic character of the various factions within the Venezuelan political class. If responsibility for the catastrophic outcome of this systemic crisis must be assigned, it lies precisely with the political elites, both Maduro supporters and the opposition.
The country's weakening was exploited by the "foreign sentinel," who now seeks to reap economic and political gain. They will find a way to make Venezuela pay tribute—because the word that matters here is "pay tribute"—and pay dearly for the folly of its political class.
Oil is crucial to the United States' plans to profit from its intervention through the payment of an imperial tribute. The Venezuelan people, unfortunately, will pay dearly, given Trumpian territorialism and neo-mercantilism, for our inability to resolve the state's general crisis on our own. We will pay with oil, but also with dependence and the loss of national and popular sovereignty over our immediate future.
But Trump was negotiating with the Maduro government, as we saw with the visit of his special envoy Richard Grenell to Caracas. Why not simply accept Maduro's offer to hand over Venezuela's resources in exchange for remaining in power?
It's clear that there came a point when Trump changed his mind and Maduro ceased to be a credible negotiating partner. That moment was when Grenell was withdrawn from the negotiations. Trump realized that Maduro was untrustworthy. And by offering everything to the United States, Maduro also lost credibility with Russia and China. Secretary of State Marco Rubio even stated in an interview that Maduro "has violated every agreement he has signed."
When Trump withdrew Grenell, many of us believed that the United States was going to take military action in Venezuela. In military terms, it was very similar to what happened with Russia and Ukraine: this military buildup wasn't intended, as some analysts suggested, to force an internal collapse. It was clear that the United States was preparing for some kind of intervention. What was at stake was how he would act and what the aftermath would look like.
Simply put, Maduro lacked the national and international credibility to be the man of geopolitical realignment. Credibility is highly valued in international politics, and Maduro's, like his rational-legal legitimacy, was nonexistent.
You pointed out that Venezuela was seen as an easy target for the United States and its desire to reconfigure its policy toward Latin America. What role did Venezuela play in the foreign policy of Trump's second term?
The target ceased to be solely Venezuela. Irrational policies were implemented, for example, against a popular and legitimately elected president like Gustavo Petro in Colombia, by including him on the Clinton List [of individuals sanctioned for alleged involvement in drug trafficking and money laundering]. Constant threats of "ground" military interventions began in Mexico, along with open electoral interference in support of candidates aligned with what we might call the MAGA International, particularly in Honduras and Argentina. Petro's recent visit to the White House, celebrated by both leaders, which included the US president's statement that Petro is "terrific," demonstrates the inconsistencies in Trump's accusations. Furthermore, the Venezuelan issue has clearly become intertwined with the Cuban issue, creating a chain of weaknesses.
Venezuela has become the lever for a much more maximalist policy toward Latin America. This shift was reflected in the National Security Strategy and the reactivation of the Monroe Doctrine, with its "Trump corollary." Behind this lies an entire school of geostrategists, from Nicholas Spykman to Robert J. Art, who conceive of territorialism in Latin America as essential in a moment of global or hegemonic conflict. According to this view, North and South America possess the resources the United States needs to survive a major global confrontation, which would inevitably destabilize the world market. The "Trump corollary" represents precisely a return to territorialism, in which the United States, by controlling the western hemisphere, can afford a large-scale global conflict without becoming isolated or falling into a general depression due to the disruption of supply chains.
That is why we have gone from Barack Obama's "pivot to Asia" to Trump's "pivot to Latin America." Latin America will pay the price for the empire's decline and its withdrawal from Europe and, above all, from Asia. Venezuela offered the Trump administration a weakened opponent, with limited military capacity and international discrediting, upon which to reorganize its Latin American policy according to the MAGA vision; the possibility of a victory at very low cost.
Ideologically, this represents the defeat of socialism, even if the Maduro regime was socialist in name only. Militarily, it is a demonstration of firepower and persuasive power. Geopolitically, it represents a power shift at the table of the great powers, something Washington longed for. Economically, it promises a substantial oil windfall for the United States and the corporations that financed Trump's campaigns, although these corporations are somewhat skeptical given the massive investments needed to reactivate the industry in a still uncertain context.
There was much talk of “regime change,” but in the end, power remains in the hands of those who governed under Maduro. How can we understand this situation?
Regarding regime change, I recently wrote an article about it. Also, in *The Long Venezuelan Depression*, I argued that the sanctions implemented during Trump’s first term had failed to achieve regime change from above, but had been absolutely successful in achieving regime change from below; that is, they had achieved regime change in the country’s political economy, steering it toward what I called a “neoliberalism with patrimonial characteristics” and a very sui generis Venezuelan model of crony capitalism.
This regime change from below has now become linked to what we could categorize as regime change from the outside, or a geopolitical realignment. A prime example of this type of dynamic is Anwar Sadat’s Egypt. The United States achieved a complete realignment—against the Soviet Union—of Egypt after Nasser's death in 1970. That is what, with some differences, the United States is doing today in Venezuela.
But it was very difficult to achieve this with Maduro, since his ability to change the country's political climate was nonexistent. Maduro tried: we can see his last interview with journalist Ignacio Ramonet, on December 30th, where he clearly states everything he was willing to give up, namely, all the country's natural resources, which, as a true patrimonialist, he believed were his. That proposal failed initially, but it became a reality with Maduroism without Maduro. So the realignment, or regime change, continues externally, and we can see it happening every day.
Do you think he will succeed in this realignment?
A few days ago, when asked why he was doing things this way, Trump said, “If you ever remember a place called Iraq, they kicked everyone out—police, generals, everyone was removed—and they ended up joining ISIS.” Trump may be right about that. He’s trying a different approach to dealing with the day after regime change. But that doesn’t mean he’s going to succeed.
Venezuela is facing a kind of "Shimonoseki moment," alluding to the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. That war, and especially the tributes that followed the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki imposed by Japan, ushered in what is known as the "era of humiliation" for China. This was later replicated in the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I—and we know where that led. That is precisely what the United States is doing today: taking advantage of the collapse of the Venezuelan state, it seeks to impose a colonial policy in the form of a protectorate and make the oil-based colonial model irreversible in the medium term.
A model in which the United States—as requested by the CEOs of the major American oil companies—guarantees, for a considerable period (20 or 30 years), that things remain unchanged and that a constant tribute is paid. What the Trump administration is proposing is a counterrevolution against Venezuelan oil nationalism, which was the backbone of the Venezuelan state during the 20th century. And I go even further: to impose this protectorate, it has the acquiescence of the two major factions of the political class.
What was the condition that made all this possible? The extreme weakening of the foundations of the Venezuelan nation, to the point that Venezuelans preferred a military intervention to the impossibility of resolving things on their own. This national weakening was the responsibility not only of the opposition, but also of the regime that for so many years ignored the consequences of its strategies to maintain power and plunder public resources.
Now the Venezuelan political class has no substantive agency whatsoever, neither the opposition nor the ruling elite. The only thing it can do is obey Washington's dictates and compete to see who is the best janitor.
How does this leave the right-wing opposition, which remains out of power?
Regarding the opposition, there is much to say. First, it's important to highlight the idiosyncrasies, the worldview, of a sector of Venezuelan society that is ignorant of Venezuela and is utterly subservient. This led a large segment of the opposition to adopt a strategy of externalizing the conflict, putting all their eggs in the basket of the foreign watchdog. If we look at María Corina Machado's speeches, especially after the presidential elections of July 28, 2024, we realize that rather than speaking to Venezuelans in Venezuela, she focused on exploiting the emotions of the Venezuelan diaspora. This reflected a complete weakening of her internal political strength, an inability to manage and capitalize on the electoral fraud.
This weakening of the opposition's internal capacity for resistance was exploited by the United States. Machado's entire discourse—which even justified the deportation of Venezuelan immigrants from the United States—was utterly irresponsible and, I dare say, criminal. Machado and the opposition political elite provided Trump with ammunition to bolster his anti-Venezuelan policy, which considers Venezuelan immigrants practically hostis humani generis [enemies of humankind], to drive not only his foreign policy but also his domestic immigration policy based on the criminalization of an entire national group. This crime was completed when they called for military intervention and stained their hands with the blood of Venezuelans killed by a foreign military force on January 3rd.
What we have now is a very significant fraction of the political class vying to see who can best guarantee the new US protectorate in the country. That's the magnitude of our tragedy.
Were you at all surprised by how quickly relations between Delcy Rodríguez's new government and Trump's became so friendly, just hours after Maduro's kidnapping?
I wasn't surprised because it was widely known that the Maduro regime had been fostering a realignment, in which they were willing to concede everything in order to maintain their grip on "political power," as they like to call it. Nor was it surprising that the much-touted slogans about a "thousand-year war," a "second Vietnam," or "permanent resistance," repeated by the government in the face of the possibility of US military action, vanished, and that in just two hours the United States captured Maduro in an operation that was extremely humiliating for the Venezuelan Armed Forces. All of this was very consistent with Maduro's regime: absolute incompetence in military terms—as in the broader management of the state—with no one taking responsibility for the military debacle.
Maduro's regime abandoned its programmatic, ideological, and ethical principles long ago. What is surprising is that Delcy Rodríguez appeared in the National Assembly to refer to the funds that the Trump administration will manage as "sovereign funds" "intended to guarantee the social protection of the Venezuelan people and to promote the country's economic and social development." This is yet another episode in the absolute distortion of language and reality to which we have become accustomed in Venezuela: the reign of Newspeak.
The situation now is as pathetic as it is worrying. Trump is issuing orders that will include absolute control over the marketing of Venezuelan oil and the completely discretionary management of the revenue from those transactions, transferring to the Venezuelan government whatever he deems appropriate, in addition to deciding what Venezuela can and cannot import and from where. Trump dictates, and they obey. “Sovereign is he who decides,” wrote Carl Schmitt, and those who are deciding in Venezuela right now are in Washington, not in Caracas.
In this neocolonial context, it will be up to the Venezuelan people, the Venezuelan nation, the remaining moral, ethical, and dignified reserves in the country, to decide how long this situation will continue. The answer will not come from either the Maduro regime or the opposition. If anyone can become an agent against all this national humiliation, it is precisely the Venezuelan people, not those responsible for this situation.
The government of Delcy Rodríguez is taking steps to amend Chávez's hydrocarbons law. What is happening in terms of state sovereignty over oil?
What is being done is to dismantle—to the delight of many in the country who have always wanted this—the foundations of Venezuelan oil nationalism, which is far from being the sole property of Chavismo. This was one of the great pillars of the construction of the Venezuelan state and nation throughout the 20th century. The Bolivarian Revolution, which had as one of its pillars precisely the vindication of oil sovereignty, is becoming the most anti-national episode in our oil history. Even worse than the Gómez regime, with its oil concessions that enriched the power elite. Today, what we have is a "lease agreement" imposed by force, in the sense that oil production is being granted to private US companies.
This reform of the Hydrocarbons Law is Venezuela's surrender as an oil-producing country and a step backward to the first half of the 20th century as a country that owned the resource. Specifically, it is a radicalization of what was already happening, a formalization of it. The precedent was the Anti-Blockade Law and the so-called "Chevron model," so celebrated by Maduro, with its production participation contracts (CPPs), through which PDVSA's [the state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela] partners manage everything within the framework of absolute operational delegation. The Chevron model will now be intensified: we will see it on steroids, as it adds the monopoly of US private companies over marketing, discretionary management of revenues, and a monopoly over imports.
Some argue: "But they pay taxes, they pay royalties." Even that isn't clear; how it works is completely opaque. The extent of the embezzlement of the nation's assets is still unclear.
Obviously, all of this goes against what is enshrined in the Constitution and the current Hydrocarbons Law. That is why it is necessary to adapt the regulations in accordance with the new reality, something that some oil companies were requesting in their meeting with Trump. This will allow oil companies with far greater expertise and capacity to enter the market, while all those shady, unknown, and dubious shell companies, like the one backed by Trump's friend Harry Sargeant, will be forced out. These companies will now have to compete with the megacorporations of Big Oil. These companies had entered the oil business without any oversight or transparency, in a completely opaque manner, under the Maduro government. The CPP (Committees for Productive Development) were the prerequisite for the arrival of crony capitalism in the oil business, through these phantom oil companies that served the interests of the political clique and were created precisely to plunder Venezuelan oil.
Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo, a Venezuelan lawyer and former Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons between 1959 and 1963, understood very well that the logical consequence of the state owning oil was the state producing oil, since being a producer was the only way to maximize revenue. A state that doesn't produce oil has no way to claim revenue from its property. In other words, ownership of oil is meaningless if you can't extract the resource.
Furthermore, the model being implemented envisions an oil-producing country dependent on importing light crude and diluents to be able to market its heavy crude. Revenue is likely to plummet, even if production increases—currently at historic lows. All of this is a consequence of having undermined PDVSA's capacity for vertical integration for 60 years.
Do you see any possibility of resistance against Trump's recolonization plans?
The future, even in the short term, is very difficult to predict because all these agreements are highly unstable. It's true that the Maduro political class is the least resistant—so to speak—to implementing Trump's foreign policy in Venezuela. It's no coincidence that the CIA reports on which Trump based his policies chose the Maduro regime to lead the transition to a protectorate. And as we can see, for the moment, it's succeeding without major problems.
But there are also some potential lines of resistance: for example, internal conflicts within the Maduro regime could cause this new normal to be disrupted at some point. Not due to issues of dignity, ethics, or policy, but rather due to power struggles within each faction, as well as attempts to make rivals pay the price. It doesn't seem that the social base of the Maduro regime—what remains of it—is going to accuse the Maduro regime without Maduro of betraying the legacy of Hugo Chávez or the Bolivarian Revolution. A lot of water has flowed under the bridge in a very long time. Maduro's regime is an utterly devoid of ideology, advocating only for the economic survival of its cronies. Its only homeland is power, its privileges tied to the control of the state.
But I do believe—and that's why I mentioned the Shimonoseki moment—that nations possess moral and ethical reserves that allow them to persevere in their very being, the conatus of the homeland. What came after the Shimonoseki moment in China? The Boxer Rebellion. The Venezuelan nation, in some way, will have to demonstrate a reservoir of dignity to reclaim our right to self-governance.
We are perhaps entering the most important crossroads in our republican history, a crossroads in which we will see how the nation rebuilds itself and begins to demand its rights, primarily its right to decide its own destiny. There will be no shortage of reactionaries who advocate for Venezuela to lose its sovereignty as penance for the catastrophic outcome of the political conflict, but there will also be no shortage of republicans and Bolivarian supporters who will advocate for freedom, sovereignty, equality, virtue, and the general and national-popular interest as a supreme value that we can give ourselves and deserve.
Do you believe a return to democratic governance is possible in the short or medium term?
The transition to democracy—including free elections—is not foreseen in the short term by the United States. Why? Because Trump makes sound decisions, in terms of his own interests, when he realizes that Maduroism without Maduro could guarantee much greater governability than a government led by María Corina Machado or Edmundo González [opposition candidate in 2024], which would have to confront democratic, economic, and popular demands that Maduroism is currently suppressing. I think we must pay close attention to this, to see what happens in the future. For Trump—and Marco Rubio—tribute comes first; democracy can wait.
I don't see, in the short or medium term, that a transition to democracy is the most important thing for the United States. The main thing is to make the protectorate irreversible or "make a lot of money," in Trump's own words. He seems to agree with the government on this, which believes that the Venezuelan people must be kept politically captive so they don't vote for the extreme right. I think other international actors—not the United States—will begin to pressure for a government with genuine electoral legitimacy as the months go by, and I think this will be no small matter.
But it's important to think about how to rebuild the state. A nation that collapses militarily, as Venezuela did on January 3rd, is not viable. But neither is a country with its healthcare system destroyed, its education system in ruins, and its political institutions lacking any legitimacy. For Trump, Venezuelans will only be able to vote when they are capable of not voting against the interests of the United States. That is, when the protectorate is irreversible. But for the Venezuelan people, political participation and electoral expression in accordance with their interests should be a vital demand.
What could the international left do to support the Venezuelan people in this critical moment?
The first thing the left should understand is that its solidarity must be with the people of Venezuela, not with the Maduro government, as has been the case. What we in Venezuela are asking for is a political ethic that stands with those who have truly endured this crisis and will continue to endure it for a long time.
This regime ceased representing the deepest and most fundamental interests of the Venezuelan people long ago—and now it no longer represents the nation's basic interests either. Nicolás Maduro's son, "Nicolasito," had no qualms about saying that Venezuela should establish relations with Israel, while what Maduro did with the global left is very similar to what Machado did with the Venezuelan diaspora: sentimental exploitation and nothing more.
The Maduro government represented a moral and strategic debacle for the left, not only in Latin America, but throughout the world. When I say strategic, I mean that Maduro orchestrated defeats that weakened the nation, but he also annihilated the ethical and political strength of the movement he inherited. He reduced it to rubble. And when he had to plunge that movement into an irreversible crisis to defend his own power, he didn't hesitate.
This attack by U.S. imperialism doesn't prove that Maduro was right. Rather, it proves that Maduro was utterly incompetent to defend the Venezuelan nation against that same imperialism. What he did was precisely to aid what the United States wanted to do to Venezuela: weaken it militarily, economically, and culturally—areas where the possibilities for social transformation lay. What we must ask ourselves is: why did an attack like this, against international law, generate hope in the majority of the Venezuelan people, both inside and outside the country?
For much of the left, Venezuelans are incapable of even sustaining a "domestic tyranny," to use an expression of Bolívar. This left denies the Maduro government any agency, even the agency to implement a despotic regime; thus, the only subject in this whole story is imperialism. The problem with much of the global left is that they don't consider Venezuelans, neither the elite nor the people, as subjects in this story, their own story. Because for them, we are merely objects of a history determined by imperialism. Imperialism's actions against Venezuela are very useful for fueling the "anti-imperialist" discourse in their respective countries. The complexities of reality matter little to them.
However, when it seems we lack the capacity to decide our own destiny, I am certain that the Venezuelan nation will be reborn in some way, sooner rather than later, and we will take the reins of our future and our destiny.
Note: This interview was also published in English in Links. International Journal of Socialist Renewal and is available here.
1. Juan Vicente Gómez established a dictatorship that lasted from 1908 to 1935, a period known as the Gomecismo [Editor's note].
Source: https://www.aporrea.org/tiburon/n415874.html