quinta-feira, 19 de março de 2026

Meningitis Fear Grips UK But What Is Really Known About This Deadly Disease

 


 
John O'Sullivan CEO Principia Scientific 
March 18, 2026

An outbreak of meningitis in the UK is focusing public attention on one of the most feared medical emergencies: inflammation of the membranes surrounding the brain and spinal cord. But what is the cause?

On March 17, 2026 the BBC reported that UK Health Secretary Wes Streeting has announced new measures to tackle what he calls the “unprecedented outbreak” of meningitis in Kent.

The BBC reports:

“Four of the meningitis cases have been confirmed as Meningitis B, or MenB – a serious bacterial form of the illness. Routine vaccination of babies for MenB was only rolled out in 2015, meaning teenagers and young adults are unlikely to have had a jab.

A targeted vaccination programme will be rolled out for students in halls of residence at the University of Kent – where one of those who died was a student – Streeting told the House of Commons.”

While health authorities emphasise infection (as per Germ Theory) as the primary cause, alternative perspectives—such as Terrain Theory—are gaining traction among independent experts, raising questions about how we understand disease itself.

As confidence in mainstream medicine has dropped since government mishandling of the COVID19 pandemic, serious questions have arisen about the true nature of such illnesses.

Below is a highly-informative video from Dr Sam Bailey, advocating for a fresh perspective on meningitis:


What Is Meningitis?

Meningitis refers to inflammation of the meninges, the protective layers around the brain and spinal cord. Symptoms can escalate rapidly and may include:

  • Severe headache

  • Neck stiffness

  • Sensitivity to light

  • Fever and confusion

  • In severe cases, seizures or death

Mainstream medicine classifies meningitis into several types, most commonly:

  • Bacterial meningitis (often linked to Neisseria meningitidis)

  • Viral meningitis

  • Less commonly, fungal or parasitic forms

Public health bodies such as the UK Health Security Agency and the World Health Organization stress that bacterial meningitis, though rare, can be life-threatening and requires urgent treatment.


Why the Current Concern?

Seasonal fluctuations, close-contact environments (schools, universities), and sporadic clusters can trigger heightened awareness. While overall case numbers remain relatively low in the UK, even isolated outbreaks receive significant attention due to the severity of the condition.

Health agencies continue to recommend:

  • Early recognition of symptoms

  • Rapid medical treatment

  • Vaccination for high-risk groups

The Terrain Theory Perspective

An alternative framework—often referred to as Terrain Theory—offers a very different interpretation.

Advocates argue that:

  • Meningitis is not a disease caused by microbes, but a response of the body to internal imbalance or toxicity

  • Microorganisms found in patients are secondary effects, not primary causes

  • Factors such as environmental toxins, pharmaceuticals, stress, or nutrition may be the true drivers of inflammation

This view challenges long-standing assumptions of germ theory, which links specific pathogens to specific diseases.


Points of Contention

The divide between these perspectives centres on several key issues:

1. Causation vs Association

Terrain Theory proponents argue that finding bacteria in patients does not prove causation.
Mainstream science responds that multiple lines of evidence—including epidemiology, laboratory studies, and treatment outcomes—support a causal role for pathogens.

2. Asymptomatic Carriers

It is well established that some people carry Neisseria meningitidis without illness.

  • Terrain view: This suggests microbes are harmless or opportunistic

  • Medical view: Carriage is normal, but under certain conditions bacteria can invade the bloodstream and cause disease

3. Effectiveness of Treatments

  • Conventional medicine: Antibiotics and supportive care reduce mortality in bacterial meningitis

  • Terrain perspective: Improvements may stem from anti-inflammatory effects rather than antimicrobial action

4. Vaccination

Health authorities state vaccines significantly reduce incidence of certain forms of meningitis.
Terrain advocates question both their necessity and underlying assumptions about causation.

What Does the Evidence Say?

The scientific consensus—supports the role of infectious agents in many cases of meningitis. This includes:

  • Identification of pathogens in cerebrospinal fluid

  • Reproducible disease patterns during outbreaks

  • Reduced incidence following vaccination programs

However, it is also true that:

  • Not all cases have a clearly identified pathogen

  • Individual susceptibility varies

  • Inflammation is central to disease severity

These points leave room for ongoing discussion about host factors, immune response, and environmental influences—areas where Terrain Theory places its emphasis.

A Broader View: Host and Environment

A more integrative perspective recognises that:

  • Disease often arises from interaction between pathogen and host condition

  • Factors such as nutrition, stress, co-existing illness, and environment can influence outcomes

  • Prevention may involve both public health measures and individual health resilience

Conclusion

Meningitis remains a serious but relatively rare condition in the UK. While mainstream medicine focuses on infectious causes and preventive strategies like vaccination, alternative viewpoints such as Terrain Theory highlight the role of internal health and environmental stressors. From my own perspective as a seasoned science writer who has grown cynical of mainstream science, which failed us all during the COVID19 pandemic, my analysis is better explained in the book, Slaying the Virus and Vaccine Dragon’which broadens PSI’s critiques of mainstream medical group think and junk science. But for the general public looking for informed guidance, the key takeaway is practical rather than ideological:

  • Recognise symptoms early

  • Seek urgent medical care when needed

  • Stay informed—but also critically evaluate sources and claims

     

                                An example of the current hysterical coverage in the UK  


References

  1. UK Health Security Agency — Meningitis guidance and surveillance reports

  2. World Health OrganizationDefeating Meningitis by 2030: Global Road Map

  3. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) — Bacterial meningitis overview and transmission data

  4. van Deuren M, Brandtzaeg P, van der Meer JWM. (2000). Update on meningococcal disease with emphasis on pathogenesis and clinical management. Clinical Microbiology Reviews

  5. Stephens DS. (2007). Conquering the meningococcus. FEMS Microbiology Reviews

  6. Caugant DA, Maiden MCJ. (2009). Meningococcal carriage and disease—population biology and evolution. Vaccine

  7. World Health Organization (2019). Meningitis factsheets and global burden data

  8. Bailey S. — Public video commentary presenting Terrain Theory interpretation of meningitis (YouTube transcript provided)

About the author:  John O’Sullivan is CEO and co-founder (with Dr Tim Ball among 45 scientists) of Principia Scientific International (PSI).  He is a seasoned science writer, retired teacher and legal analyst who assisted skeptic climatologist Dr Ball in defeating UN climate expert, Michael ‘hockey stick’ Mann in the multi-million-dollar ‘science trial of the century‘. From 2010 O’Sullivan led the original ‘Slayers’ group of scientists who compiled the book ‘Slaying the Sky Dragon: Death of the Greenhouse Gas Theory’ debunking alarmist lies about carbon dioxide plus their follow-up climate book. His most recent publication, ‘Slaying the Virus and Vaccine Dragon’ broadens PSI’s critiques of mainstream medical group think and junk science.

 

Source: https://principia-scientific.com/meningitis-fear-grips-uk-but-what-is-really-known-about-this-deadly-disease/

The assassination of Ali Larijani and the logic of strategic martyrdom

 


The assassination of Ali Larijani, like that of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei before him, must be understood within a pattern that could be called strategic martyrdom.
 

Xavier Villar
March 18th, 2026 (leer en castellano)

This dynamic highlights the limitations of Israel and the United States' reliance on decapitation strategies, particularly in the face of recurring historical failures. The decapitation-attrition-invasion playbook that Washington and Tel Aviv seem to follow reveals systems anchored in a repertoire of violence that fails to adapt to the logic of actors with different political-strategic structures. Even Donald Trump implicitly acknowledged this limitation when he admitted that the United States attacked Iran out of "habit."

The basic premise of decapitation holds that by eliminating high-ranking leaders, the system they uphold will weaken or fragment. However, this assumption reflects a narrow instrumental rationality, where the survival of the leadership is considered the primary strategic objective and the threat of death is presumed to function as effective coercion. Iran, in contrast, operates under a value-strategic rationale in which martyrdom can play a political role and produce strategic effects that not only resist but reverse the intended effects of the decapitation.

Larijani's attendance at mass rallies and his issuance of statements acknowledging the possibility of his death demonstrate that this logic is consciously adopted by leaders who understand its implications. This perspective had already been expressed by Khamenei, who stated that "either we are martyred on this path, whose honor is eternal, or we achieve victory; both are victories for us." The underlying logic is not epic, but strategic: it transforms the elimination of a leader into a vector of political resilience and institutional cohesion.

By turning assassinated figures into symbols of justice and resistance, following the historical tradition of Imam Hussein at Karbala, martyrdom redefines the intended effects of 
the decapitation strategy. This mechanism of internal mobilization legitimizes the political order, reinforces institutional continuity, and amplifies social resilience. The death of a high-ranking official does not indicate a failure of the system; it reflects that its structure rests on principles that transcend the mere physical survival of its leaders. This understanding eludes those who conceive of assassination campaigns as instruments of direct pressure.

The logic of strategic martyrdom is clearly embodied in Larijani. The disappearance of a figure who operated at the intersection of security, politics, and diplomacy does not paralyze the system; it activates its internal mechanisms of adaptation, integrating it into the leadership of Mukhta Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. What in a Western analysis might be interpreted as a loss of internal diversity confirms, for the Iranian system, that its survival depends on adhering to a political logic where sacrifice and continuity are mutually reinforcing. The question is not who will fill Larijani's shoes, but how his example will strengthen the resolve of those who continue the institutional work. 

Larijani cannot be simplistically classified as a hawk or a dove, categories of Western convenience. He was a first-rate political operator, capable of translating the logic of the battlefield into a language understandable to both orthodox sectors and pragmatic factions. His value lay not only in the information he possessed or the international contacts he maintained, but also in his ability to build internal consensus within a system that, under extreme pressure, needs to articulate coordinated responses. He represented a bridge between military logic and the strategic projection of the state. His absence implies that future political articulation will absorb his experience and integrate it into a narrative of continuity where each martyr adds legitimacy to the common cause.

The timing of his death underscores this interpretation. The attack occurred when the US- and Israeli-led coalition had accumulated tactical successes: bombings of Iranian military infrastructure, pressure in the Gulf, and ground operations in southern Lebanon. However, the adversary's strategic collapse has not yet materialized. The Islamic Republic maintains a military response capability, employing missiles and drones against Israeli command centers and through proxies in Iraq, Syria, and the Red Sea. The Strait of Hormuz remains under Iran's effective control, regulating the global flow of energy with far-reaching political and economic implications. The war, now in its eighteenth day, is taking on the characteristics of a war of attrition where political resistance and institutional organization are as crucial as firepower.

In this context, the elimination of Larijani serves a broader purpose: if the system cannot be subdued militarily, the aim is to reduce its capacity to formulate strategic responses. The coalition seeks to prolong the war to wear down the adversary. This strategy, however, underestimates the Iranian logic: each blow becomes an institutional reinforcement that consolidates the very structures it was intended to weaken. Iran has reiterated that it will not seek a ceasefire until the balance of deterrence is altered, and every action against its leaders strengthens internal cohesion and strategic resolve. The more the coalition insists on decapitation, the more evident it becomes that martyrdom constitutes a central axis of resistance.

The opposing side shows signs of attrition that transcend the military sphere and affect domestic politics. Dissension within the US security apparatus, with the departure of officials like Joe Kent, reflects a profound debate about the direction and coherence of the war. These are not minor tactical disagreements, but rather a fracture in the understanding of strategic objectives. More tangible is the operational attrition: the withdrawal of the USS Gerald Ford to the Mediterranean and the redeployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln limit the capacity for immediate power projection in the Gulf and the Red Sea. The degradation of radar and surveillance coverage, damaged by sustained Iranian attacks, reduces the coalition's flexibility. The war machine shows signs of fatigue with clear political and strategic implications.

Internationally, the US administration's efforts to present the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz as a central objective are met with a lukewarm response from European and Asian allies. Reluctant to bear the direct costs of a conflict whose economic consequences they are already facing, and with the Gulf states under increasing pressure on their energy infrastructure, the coalition is holding together on a narrower political base than anticipated. The gap between stated objectives and actual readiness limits both operational capacity and political cohesion. Each day without a resolution erodes this base, while Iran watches as time favors those who exercise strategic patience with discipline.

The trajectory of the conflict indicates a strategic stalemate. The US-Israeli coalition is accumulating tactical victories, but none have broken Iran's will or capacity for resistance. The assassination of Larijani illustrates this dynamic: a blow that deprives Iran of one of its most experienced operatives, but which simultaneously activates internal cohesion mechanisms, making the resolution of the conflict more complex. Larijani, who built bridges throughout his life, becomes a symbol of unity. His example will be a guiding light in times of uncertainty, and his memory will reinforce the strategic determination to continue the resistance.In Tehran, the political response focuses on institutional continuity. Far from fragmenting, the country's leadership is unified around the shared experience of aggression and the need for coherent responses that incorporate the sacrifice of the martyrs. This is not a naive belief in military victory, but rather a political analysis of the balance of power: as long as external pressure does not produce internal fractures, and as long as each blow can be transformed into a pillar of legitimacy through the logic of strategic martyrdom, the capacity for resistance remains the Islamic Republic's principal asset. The war is entering a phase where politics, understood as a system's capacity to endure and transform adversity into cohesion, outweighs any blow on the ground. Larijani's death, while silencing a voice with a distinct character, does not alter the fundamental equation: the system's survival is the central objective, and the capacity to absorb pain and translate it into symbolism constitutes a strategic resource that no campaign of decapitation can neutralize.

The paradox that war planners fail to grasp is clear: the more blows they strike, the stronger the adversary becomes. The logic of strategic martyrdom transforms each assassination into a political boost for the victim. Larijani, like Khamenei before him, will not be remembered as a victim, but as a figure whose disappearance strengthens the system's cohesion. As long as this logic persists, the war cannot be resolved solely through military means. The US-led coalition, in its instrumental rationality, clings to a playbook that empirical evidence proves inadequate. The question is not whether there will be more attacks, but whether those who carry them out understand that each martyrdom strengthens what they intended to weaken. Events suggest they do not. This limited understanding defines the true strategic dimension of the conflict.

Source:  https://www.hispantv.com/noticias/opinion/641757/asesinato-ali-larijani-logica-martirio-estrategico

quarta-feira, 18 de março de 2026

A Chokepoint for Modern Medicine: The Strait of Hormuz and the Hidden Fragility of Global Health Supply Chains



How the world’s most critical energy corridor underpins—and endangers—the flow of pharmaceutical ingredients and medical materials worldwide

Iran's strikes inside UAE fuel 'rapid collapse' of genocidal RSF militia in Sudan



Drone attacks in Sudan launched by both sides of the conflict – the Sudanese army and the RSF – have killed 200 civilians so far this month 

Iran's retaliatory strikes on Israel and the UAE are contributing to a quick collapse of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a UAE-backed paramilitary group fighting in Sudan's civil war, The Canary reported on 13 March.

With weapons and funding from the UAE and Israel, the RSF has been fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) since April 2023 in a war that has killed tens of thousands and forced 11 million people to flee their homes.

But the UAE and Israel are seeing their supply lines to the RSF disrupted amid Iranian missile and drone strikes since the start of the US-Israeli war on the Islamic Republic, starting on 28 February.

Iranian attacks have closed the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off the UAE's shipping and oil export routes, and causing severe economic losses.

According to The Canary, the RSF had been making strong gains until February; “However, Sudanese government forces have achieved a string of military victories that appear to be turning into a rout.”

The Sudanese army is successfully targeting RSF arms and supply depots, and cutting off frontline RSF troops from the ammunition, fuel, and supplies needed to fight.

In the context, the Sudanese army announced on Thursday it had captured two areas in the Blue Nile region – the southeastern province that has seen heavy fighting since January.

The 4th Infantry Division, the army's primary command in the region, said in a statement that its troops and allied forces “cleared” Jort East and the Ballamo Camp following battles against the RSF and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Joseph Touka.

Military officials stated the operation was part of a broader campaign to secure strategic locations in the southern sector.

The Sudanese army's advance has come amid an escalation in drone attacks targeting civilians by both sides in the conflict.


UN rights chief Volker Turk stated on Thursday he was “appalled” at reports that drone attacks had killed more than 200 civilians in Sudan since 4 March.

Turk said Sudanese army drone strikes in West Kordofan had killed at least 152 civilians. Among them were at least 50 who were killed when a drone targeted a market and a hospital on 4 March in the town of Muglad.

On 7 March, Sudanese army drone attacks on two separate markets in RSF-controlled Abu Zabad and Wad Banda left at least 40 civilians dead.

Another Sudanese army drone targeted a truck carrying civilians in Al-Sunut on 10 March, reportedly killing at least 50 civilians, Volker added.

Meanwhile, the White Nile region has come under heavy attack by RSF drones since 4 March.

Volker also said that an RSF drone targeted a secondary school and a health clinic in Shukeiri village on 11 March, killing at least 17 civilians.


Fighting has also escalated in South Sudan, as a 2018 power-sharing deal between the current President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, and his long-time rival, the detained South Sudanese former vice president Riek Machar, has been unravelling in the past year.

South Sudanese government forces announced on Thursday the recapture of the opposition-held town of Akobo following a major military offensive.

“Akobo is safe, the surrounding areas are safe,” says General Lul Ruai Koang, a spokesperson for the South Sudan People's Defense Forces (SSPDF).

Before the offensive, the army had issued an evacuation order for civilians, causing some 200,000 people to flee to neighboring Ethiopia as a result.

Akobo was one of the last remaining strongholds of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) – the armed movement loyal to Riek Machar.

South Sudan gained independence in 2011 but soon descended into civil war and remains mired in extreme poverty and corruption.

 

Source: https://thecradle.co/articles-id/36461 

terça-feira, 17 de março de 2026

CIA Assessment: The Resistance cannot be crushed

 



Kit Klarenberg
Source: Al Mayadeen English
15 Mar 2026

The Israeli-American war on Iran was intended to be a lightning strike routine, fought exclusively from the air, lasting only a few days. Instead, Washington and its Zionist proxy have blundered into a major multi-front conflict, which could well threaten the Empire’s very existence. The initial US aerial bombardment’s centerpiece was the murder of Iranian Leader Sayyed Ali Khamenei on February 28th. Initially hailed by Western media as “the assassination of the century,” the vile act has resulted in catastrophe for the perpetrators.

Iran's relentless battering of Zionist entity civilian centers and military and intelligence infrastructure, and US bases throughout West Asia, hasn’t been deterred one iota. Vast crowds took to the streets of Tehran in vengeful mourning. Their righteous anger has pullulated throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Ever since, incensed protestors have violently clashed with security forces in multiple major Pakistani cities. Meanwhile, Bahrain teeters on the brink of all-out revolution. Now, Sayyed Mojtaba Khamenei, the martyred Leader’s son, has taken his place. 

Iranian citizens of every ethnic and religious extraction braved US-Israeli airstrikes to celebrate his ascension. Commonly perceived as a hardliner with strong ties to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, the expectation that the new Leader will adopt a considerably less conciliatory, patient approach than his father is widespread. Western sources forecast Sayyed Mojtaba may decide the Islamic Republic “must move quickly to obtain nuclear weapons in order to forestall future US and Israeli attacks,” overturning Sayyed Ali Khamenei’s longstanding fatwa against their development by Tehran.

US President Donald Trump has declared he is “not happy” with Sayyed Mojtaba taking power, and Israeli apparatchiks are likewise perturbed by the development. Nonetheless, this was an inevitable upshot of assassinating the former Leader, and there was no reason to believe doing so would precipitate the Islamic Republic’s collapse, or lead to Tehran’s military submission. It begs the obvious question of why Washington and Tel Aviv electively helped in the ascension of a ruler more committed than ever to expelling the Empire from West Asia. 

Similarly, Hezbollah’s extraordinary broadsides of the Zionist entity since Sayyed Khamenei’s assassination should dispel any notion, as perpetuated by Israeli political and military chiefs, that the group was obliterated by Tel Aviv’s criminal October 2024 invasion of Lebanon. That incursion was prefaced by an operation in which thousands of pagers used by senior Hezbollah operatives were detonated simultaneously, having been wired with explosives by Mossad pre-purchase, killing and injuring hundreds. A week-and-a-half later, the group’s Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah was martyred in a Zionist entity airstrike. 

Evidently, the Resistance cannot be crushed via high-level assassinations. In fact, such actions actively strengthen its members. This uncomfortable reality has been well-known to the CIA since at least 2009. In July that year, the Agency produced a top-secret assessment laying out the pros and cons of liquidating “high value targets” (HVTs). It was prepared in advance of Barack Obama’s CIA chief Leon Panetta shifting US “counter-terror” operations from capturing and torturing high-level suspects to outright executing them.

The assessment concluded that HVT operations “can play a useful role when they are part of a broader counterinsurgency strategy,” and sought to “assist policymakers and military officers involved in authorizing or planning” such strikes. However, it listed many “potential negative effects” of “high value” assassinations. "Israel’s" past killings of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders were specifically cited as examples of how the strategy can spectacularly backfire. We have witnessed the CIA’s unheeded cautions play out in real-time since February 28th. 

Foremost among prospective blowback from HVT operations is the risk high-level assassinations can increase an “insurgent” group’s support. This occurs when killing a target “[strengthens] an armed group’s bond with the population, radicalizing an insurgent group’s remaining leaders, creating a vacuum into which more radical groups can enter, and escalating or deescalating a conflict in ways that favor the insurgents.” Such actions can also “[erode] the ‘rules of the game’ between the government and insurgents,” thus exacerbating “the level of violence in a conflict”:

“HVT strikes, however, may increase support for the insurgents, particularly if these strikes enhance insurgent leaders’ lore, if noncombatants are killed in the attacks, if legitimate or semilegitimate politicians aligned with the insurgents are targeted…An insurgent group’s unifying cause, deep ties to its constituency, or a broad support base can lessen the impact of leadership losses by ensuring a steady flow of replacement recruits.” 

The CIA assessment noted several historical instances of supposed HVT successes. When high-level targets have “prominent public profiles”, assassinations can, in specific instances, shatter a target group. However, this was not the case with Hamas or Hezbollah. The pair “carry out state-like functions, such as providing healthcare services,” so group leaders are well-known to citizens of Gaza and Lebanon. Yet, their “highly disciplined nature, social service network, and reserve of respected leaders” mean they can easily “reorganize” in the wake of assassinations. 

The Zionist entity had by this point been engaged in “targeted killings” against Hamas, Hezbollah, and other Resistance groups since the mid-1990s. However, their “decentralized command structures, compartmented leadership, strong succession planning, and deep ties to their communities” made them “highly resilient to leadership losses.” Undeterred, Tel Aviv’s high-level assassinations continued apace. In the early 2000s, Hamas founder Sheikh Yassin and the group’s leader in Gaza, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, were murdered. However, the killings “strengthened solidarity” between Resistance factions, while “[bolstering] support for hardline militant leaders.” 

The obvious lessons of this wanton bloodletting remained unlearned by the Zionist entity, once the Gaza Holocaust erupted. In June 2024, elite imperial journal Foreign Affairs published a report unequivocally headlined Hamas Is Winning. It boldly concluded, “Israel’s failing strategy makes its enemy stronger.” The outlet also recorded how “according to the measures that matter,” Hamas had grown considerably bigger and more powerful than on October 7th, 2023. "Israel" had thus stumbled into a deeply ruinous attritional war, with a “tenacious and deadly guerrilla force.”

Hamas’ surging popularity with Palestinians throughout the Gaza genocide was found to have significantly enhanced the group’s “ability to recruit, especially its ability to attract new generations of fighters and operatives.” This granted Hamas the ability to launch “lethal operations” in areas previously “cleared” by the IOF “easily”. Foreign Affairs charged that the Zionist entity, to its “great detriment”, failed to comprehend how “the carnage and devastation it has unleashed in Gaza has only made its enemy stronger.”

It is not just Hamas that has been galvanized by the Gaza genocide. "Israel’s" “carnage and devastation” has greatly expanded the ranks and resolve of the entire Resistance, while its constituent members have rapidly won hearts and minds within and without West Asia in ever-mounting numbers. Joint attacks on the Zionist entity have gathered in pace and intensity. With Sayyed Mojtaba Khamenei as the new Iranian Leader, the Islamic Republic and all her allies are fully committed to Palestine’s long-overdue liberation, by any means necessary.

 

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect Al Mayadeen’s editorial stance.
 
Source:  https://english.almayadeen.net/articles/analysis/cia-assessment--the-resistance-cannot-be-crushed

European allies refuse US request to help open Strait of Hormuz


Smoke rises from the Thai bulk carrier 'Mayuree Naree' near the Strait of Hormuz after an attack, on 11 March 2026 (Handout/Royal Thai Navy/AFP) 


Middle east Eye
 
16 March 2026

European allies have pushed back on a US request to help re-open the Strait of Hormuz, with Germany stating outright that the conflict with Iran was "not Nato's war".

Iran moved to close the strait last week in response to Israel and US attacks on the country, blocking a passage where more than 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas supply moves through.

Despite a call from US President Donald Trump over the weekend for allied assistance, there has been widespread reluctance to get involved in the war.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz's spokesman said the conflict has "nothing to do with Nato". 

"Nato is an alliance for the defence of territory," said Stefan Kornelius. "The mandate to deploy Nato is lacking" in the current situation, he told reporters.

German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius added that while there would be "no military participation", they would seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis. 

For his part, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer also ruled out a Nato mission, but said he was working with allies to come up with a "viable" plan to reopen the waterway.

"We're working with all of our allies, including our European partners, to bring together a viable collective plan that can restore freedom of navigation in the region as quickly as possible and ease the economic impacts," he said in Downing Street.

"Let me be clear: that won't be, and it's never been envisioned to be, a Nato mission."

Energy Secretary Ed Miliband said on Sunday that the British government was considering sending minesweeping drones rather than warships to Hormuz.

The French foreign ministry also confirmed that France would not send ships to the Strait, writing on X that its naval mission is in the Eastern Mediterranean and remains "defensive".

'Very bad for the future of Nato'

Spain, which has been the most vocal critic of the war on Iran in Europe, also ruled it out, with Defence Minister Margarita Robles saying Madrid was "absolutely not" mulling a military contribution. 

Poland, likewise, dismissed any involvement in a naval operation to open the strait.

The lukewarm response from European capitals came after Japan and Australia voiced similar sentiments earlier on Monday, with Canberra noting it would not be sending a navy ship to the Strait of Hormuz.

Trump has warned that the refusal of allied countries to help open up the strait would be "very bad for the future of Nato", without elaborating.

A number of Scandinavian and Baltic countries, which have been keen to ensure US support over Russia's activities near their borders, suggested they were not closing the door on the issue.

"We did not want this war. From day one, we have called for de-escalation," Denmark's foreign minister, Lars Lokke Rasmussen, told Danish media in Brussels before an EU foreign ministers' meeting. 

"That said, I believe we need to keep an open mind and look at how we can contribute."

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kestutis Budrys told reporters in Brussels: "Nato countries should consider" a US request for help but said they would "need to see the entire operational environment and the capabilities with which we could contribute".

His Estonian counterpart said his country was "always ready for discussions with the US, including now regarding the situation in the Strait of Hormuz". 



Source: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/european-allies-refuse-us-request-help-open-strait-hormuz

The strategic dismantling of Israel




Alon Mizrahi
March 17th

Things have just got real in Tel Aviv, and Israel. The actual pain and destruction have begun. 

Earlier today, Iran targeted a train station in the center of the country. I didn't want to draw conclusions from it, and waited to see if it was the onset of something new. 

Now, there's confirmation. Iran has just destroyed one of Israel's largest train stations in Tel Aviv, and potentially incapacitated a major part of train movement in the entire country.

Israel is a tiny country and has just one major north-south railway, with the biggest stations situated in Haifa and Tel Aviv. Cutting the train movement there means Israel has no mass transit (the roads are heavily jammed routinely). 

These are also major transportation hubs, with Israel's busiest and most strategic roads going nearby; breaking some bridges along these roads puts the entire center of the country at a standstill. 

 


This also has far-reaching military consequences: the train is the main transportation solution for IDF soldiers. If what I suspect is taking place becomes reality, hundreds of thousands of soldiers will not be able to travel to or from home with any measure of efficacy. 

More importantly, it's going to become extremely more difficult for Israel to move large number of soldiers north or south when a major call for reservation is announced. A logistical nightmare. 

The economic implications of the train being disabled are astronomical: hundreds of thousands of Israelis travel to work each day by train. 

This could all be foreseen in advance. A year and a half ago I wrote an article titled 'Iran can end Israel in a few Hours', where I anticipated precisely this scenario. 

Iran has started the strategic destruction of Israel.

 

Source: https://x.com/alon_mizrahi/status/2034051574365098140