Christian Cirilli
January 5th, 2026 (Leer en castellano)
Even acknowledging the risk involved in writing so soon after the events, the attack and the deployment of US special forces seem more like internal betrayal than a flawless military operation.
It is striking that President Nicolás Maduro was the only one detained and kidnapped, when not only he, but the entire military and political leadership were identified as “part of the narco-terrorist regime,” and several of them even had substantial rewards offered for their capture.
Questions arise that are impossible to answer with certainty in such a short time. I myself had predicted the possibility of a special, swift, and decisive operation. However, I also assumed that Chavismo retained a hard core willing to resist, and that any attempt at intervention would result in serious clashes and heavy casualties for the invader.
To illustrate, also on January 3rd, but in 1990, the Panamanian dictator—and CIA agent—Manuel Noriega was finally arrested after an overwhelming ground invasion that included helicopter landings, aerial bombardments, and the intensive use of armored vehicles and artillery. This was Operation "Just Cause," designed to clip the wings of the undisciplined Noriega. Panama, with far fewer human and material resources, made them pay dearly for their defeat and offered fierce resistance. At first glance, nothing similar is observed in Venezuela today, even though the country has sufficient reserves to mount a respectable defense.
It is particularly striking, then, that US special forces entered nothing less than Caracas, a densely populated and—in theory—heavily defended capital, with a reputation for being “tough,” as if they were advancing along a clear highway. Moreover, without any blanket of absolute darkness, they were perfectly distinguishable.
I wonder how it is possible that President Maduro was so quickly identified and extracted without, as far as we know, any resistance from his security detail, which should have been loyal and effective.
I also wonder how it is possible that Diosdado Cabello, one of the most extreme figures of Chavismo, survived the attack and is strolling through the streets of Caracas—he did!—accompanied by a group of heavily armed men, just hours after the events, almost certain that “they wouldn’t touch him.” Even stranger is what he says: it turns out that now they have to be “on alert” because before that, “the people were asleep.” Is he speaking literally or metaphorically?
Or Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, standing on a platform with the Venezuelan flag behind him, completely calm.
The same goes for Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, who, four hours after Maduro's abduction, merely demands "proof of life" from the president, like Lando Calrissian begging Darth Vader not to kill Han Solo and settle for freezing him in carbonite.
And what about the hundreds and hundreds of Igla portable anti-aircraft missiles that Chávez bought from Russia specifically for this situation? Weren't they distributed among the troops? It's understandable that electronic interference or attacks on radar and communications nodes could disable complex, radar-guided systems. But the Igla requires only one operator and confirmation from the infrared sensor! They are "fire-and-forget" systems. The helicopters were visible to the naked eye. Why wasn't a single one activated? Weren't they deployed near the presidential residence or wherever Maduro was? What are they there for then?
Those Igla helicopters could have taken down the heavy Chinooks or the vulnerable Black Hawks, one after another. If used properly, they would have caused a massacre. The Somalis did much more with simple AK-47s in Mogadishu in 1993 (an event that later inspired Ridley Scott's film Black Hawk Down).
Everything indicates that Venezuelan troops were aware of what was happening, yet they did not respond. The country was on combat alert, and yet it did not fight!
Questions multiply as videos and statements emerge. Was Maduro's "surrender" a signal from the Venezuelan Armed Forces to negotiate a way out with impunity should a future liberal government take power? Did the Revolution self-destruct, then? Or was it a way to get rid of the inflexible Maduro and negotiate on their own? Does María Corina Machado (finally!) have what she was missing—soldiers loyal to her—to lead a supposed "national reconciliation"? Or did Maduro surrender—as suggested by British media outlets like the insidious Sky News—to safeguard the country from total destruction? (which seems quite implausible)
The hypothesis closest to reality, however, is that Maduro wasn't kidnapped as a result of a brilliant military operation—surgical, flawless—but rather that he was DECEIVED and DELIVERED by his own security detail and, probably, by some of his political colleagues. The lack of a military response would suggest the existence of an explicit order not to act, despite the subsequent posturing.
It's clear that, while the United States deployed resources, carried out shows of force, and executed bombing feints, the CIA was operating in the shadows, surreptitiously contacting both mid-level officers and, crucially, the military high command. This interpretation becomes increasingly consistent as the hours pass.
In fact, analysts like Scott Ritter have repeatedly maintained that the real coup de grâce wouldn't be delivered by the U.S. armed forces, but by intelligence, pointing out that the outcome of these types of operations is usually determined long before the first shot is fired.
Frankly, the complete absence of an urban battle—in a context of months of military preparation, with a supposed state of maximum alert to repel attacks, and in nothing less than the nation's capital—is a profoundly anomalous and disturbing fact.
This is not simply a meticulously planned military operation, but an act of political destabilization of enormous gravity, including internal betrayals, potentially far more devastating than a massive bombing. The damage caused by a rupture of this kind is structural and lasting. Even loyalists are left "in the same mud, all pawed over" (as the tango Cambalache says).
The Bolivarian Revolution is exhibiting, for the first time explicitly, a significant internal fracture. And at the center of this rift, inevitably, appears the figure of a Judas: someone with real power, privileged access, and decision-making capacity, who chose to cross the line at the decisive moment. Let's not forget there was a $50 million reward…
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That figure—whoever it may be—now holds the key to the transition. Venezuela is going through one of the most turbulent and uncertain periods in its recent history. The real battleground is no longer military, but political and negotiating. Is that why Trump is ending the intervention? The Chavista government and the armed forces remain practically intact! So what is the unstated objective? To obtain oil concessions while keeping Chavismo alive?
Going forward, we will have to carefully observe what kind of “negotiations” are set in motion, who participates in them, and, above all, who is excluded. In fact, nothing guarantees that María Corina Machado will have a future in Miraflores. Her usefulness may have been circumstantial, not structural. It's striking that there are no riots in the streets of Caracas… quite the opposite, in fact; there's a tense calm… Is there an order to avoid further escalating the situation in the context of a transitional dialogue?
It cannot be ruled out that we are witnessing the dawn of a new leadership, less ideologically driven, more aligned with regional power dynamics, and significantly more inclined toward US interests. A leadership that doesn't necessarily emerge from the traditional opposition, but rather from within the very folds of the power structure that is currently being reconfigured.
Source: https://chcirilli.wordpress.com/2026/01/03/cayo-maduro-purgado-por-el-chavismo/
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